We study how competitive pressure influences the make-or-buy decision that oligopolistic firms face between producing an intermediate component in-house or purchasing it from a domestic supplier. We model outsourcing as a bilateral relationship in which the supplier undertakes relationship-specific investments. A home and foreign firm compete in the home market. Firms' mode of operation decision depends on cost and strategic considerations. Competitive pressure increases firms' incentive to outsource. Consumer gains from trade liberalisation are enhanced when it leads to less outsourcing.
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There has been a rapid expansion in outsourcing in recent years, with firms outsourcing activities as diverse as final assembly, R&D and after-sales services. The possibility of outsourcing faces the firm with fundamental decisions with respect to its mode of operation. The majority of the theoretical literature on the mode of operation decision by firms hinges on the conventional view that outsourcing is driven by cost considerations. Cost considerations are of course important determinants of outsourcing. However, the existing empirical evidence is by no means conclusive as to the contribution of outsourcing to cost savings and/or to improvements in the quality of intermediates and suggests that cost-saving may not offer an exhaustive explanation of the widespread use of outsourcing.
In this paper we offer an explanation of this evidence by demonstrating that in concentrated industries strategic considerations may interact with cost considerations in determining the make-or-buy decision of firms. Specifically, we argue that in oligopolistic industries firms may choose their mode of operation strategically to affect the behaviour of competitors.
We develop a model of endogenous outsourcing in an international oligopoly setting where a final good producer enters a bilateral relationship with an upstream supplier which undertakes relationship-specific investments. The fact that an enforceable contract cannot be written in advance of the relationship specific investment gives rise to a hold-up problem that leads to an underinvestment in quality since the supplier anticipates that it will not capture all of the marginal benefit of investment. This may in turn result in a higher marginal production cost for the final producer. The main advantage of vertical integration for the final producer is that it avoids the underinvestment problem and its main disadvantage is the existence of a fixed corporate governance cost associated with managing a larger and more complex organisation. Outsourcing, instead, involves accepting higher marginal costs in exchange for a saving on fixed (governance) costs. In a Cournot oligopoly setting, this gives rise to an additional strategic incentive to vertically integrate -as the lower marginal costs reduce the rival's output and thus indirectly raises the integrated firm's profits. However, strategic outsourcing is also a possibility even when it results in higher marginal costs. This is because when a firm chooses outsourcing, the rival firm's incentive to invest strategically is reduced. We show that when a firm has a sufficiently small market share under vertical integration, it has an incentive to strategically switch to outsourcing so as to increase its own and reduce its rival's investment and output.
We show that the choice of the mode of operation by firms depends the competitive pressure facing firms, the latter being directly affected by trade liberalisation. In general, an increase in competitive pressure leads to a greater 'demand' for outsourcing and to a reduction in its 'supply'. Thus our model suggests that we can expect outsourcing to be more likely when firms face intermediate levels of competitive pressure (and of trade costs).
Unlike most contributions in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002) , this model gives rise to the possibility of 'mixed outcomes' even with ex-ante symmetry between firms -consistent with existing stylised facts whereby not all firms in the same industry and in all countries adopt the same mode of operation strategy. INTRODUCTION This paper aims to shed light on the organisational form of production in oligopolistic settings.
We focus on how changes in the level of competitive pressure influence the make-or-buy decision that a firm faces between producing an intermediate component in-house (thus opting for vertical integration) or purchasing it from a domestic supplier (i.e. outsourcing it to an upstream firm). We apply our analysis to a set up where trade liberalisation affects the mode of operation decision through its effects on the competitive pressure facing firms.
There has been a rapid expansion in outsourcing in recent years, with firms outsourcing activities as diverse as final assembly, R&D and after-sales services. The possibility of outsourcing faces the firm with fundamental decisions with respect to its mode of operationwhether to produce in house or to outsource and whether to outsource to domestic or to foreign suppliers. The growing importance of outsourcing has resulted in the huge increase in interest that this phenomenon has received, both empirically and theoretically, in the academic literature. Although there is now a vast and diverse theoretical literature on outsourcing, the most influential strand of this dates back to Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , and Grossman and Hart (1986) and is based on the role of incomplete contracts, asset specificity and transaction costs in guiding firms' mode of operation decisions within choice theoretic frameworks that focus on the bilateral relationship between a single producer and a potential supplier. More recently, a number of authors have suggested the need to contextualise this relationship within theoretical frameworks that allow for the interdependence between firms' choice and market structure and/or general equilibrium effects. McLaren (2000) , Grossman and Helpman (2002 , and Antràs and Helpman (2004) endogenise market structure in frameworks with matching and find that outsourcing is more attractive the 'thicker' is the market for suppliers. Entry of upstream firms, in turn, is more likely the 'thicker' the market for potential buyers. In most cases in these models, downstream firms must choose between vertical integration that may involve higher governance costs and entering an outsourcing relationship with an upstream firm that is beset with problems of contract incompleteness which typically arise because the supplier must make a 1 See for instance Abraham and Taylor (1996) , Audet (1996) , Feenstra (1998) , Campa and Goldberg (1997) , Hummels et al (2001) , and Bartel et al (2005) . relationship specific investment (RSI) to customise the inputs for the downstream firms. Even though the final producer can recognise after delivery if the input has the desired features, firms cannot sign an enforceable contract ex-ante that specifies all its characteristics 2 -thus giving rise to a hold-up problem. Some of these papers focus on domestic outsourcing while others consider international outsourcing and foreign direct investment. 3 In all cases, the theoretical models developed in this strand of the literature are based on general equilibrium frameworks with monopolistically competitive market structures and they thus abstract from strategic interaction between firms.
The majority of the theoretical literature on the mode of operation decision by firms hinges on the conventional view that outsourcing is mainly driven by cost considerations. In a sense, it could be argued that this also applies to the recent contributions by Antràs, Grossman and
Helpman mentioned above, to the extent that 'market thickness' (by making matching more efficient) ultimately reduces costs. Cost considerations are of course important determinants of outsourcing.
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However, the existing empirical evidence is by no means conclusive as to the contribution of outsourcing to cost savings and/or to improvements in the quality of intermediates. 5 This evidence suggests that cost-savings may not offer an exhaustive explanation of the widespread use of outsourcing.
We contend in this paper that in concentrated industries (where firms have significant degrees of market power) strategic considerations may interact with cost considerations in determining the make-or-buy decision of firms. Specifically, we argue that firms may choose their mode of operation strategically to affect the behaviour of competitors. Clearly, the exploration of this conjecture requires a departure from monopolistically competitive market structures to consider oligopolistic settings.
2
As in Hart and Moore (1990) , this contract incompleteness originates from the inability of third parties to verify the suitability of the inputs provided by the suppliers. See Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006) for overviews.
3
In Grossman and Helpman (2002) firms choose between domestic outsourcing and vertical integration, in Grossman and Helpman (2003) firms choose between foreign direct investment and foreign outsourcing. Antràs and Helpman (2004) allow for all four possibilities -vertical integration at home or abroad and domestic and foreign outsourcing. For instance, a recent UK survey by Manpower found that the main motivation behind outsourcing of services is cost reduction (http://www.manpower.co.uk/news/OutsourcingSurvey.pdf)
5
A recent survey by Software Development Magazine (2004) found that over half of the IT specialists interviewed reported that the quality of outsourced services was inferior to that produced in-house. For example, using firmlevel panel data from the German cost structure survey over the period 1992-2000, Görzig and Stephan (2002) find that firms that outsourced service functions previously provided within the firm experienced a deterioration of return per employee. A negative relationship between outsourcing and firm level profitability is found for smaller firms by Görg and Hanley (2004) for the electronic industry in Ireland.
3
The existence of a link between strategy and firms' mode of operation is not entirely new.
Within a Cournot setting, Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999) show that organisational choices are affected by strategic considerations in the firm-customer transactions. Shy and Stenbacka (2003) show that competition in the upstream industry affects production efficiency and the choice in the mode of operation of a downstream differentiated Bertrand duopoly when vertical integration involves higher fixed costs but lower marginal costs. Chen et al (2004) present a special case of outsourcing where an oligopolistic domestic firm may buy an intermediate from a more efficient firm that is also its competitor on the final goods market. This type of outsourcing, which facilitates collusion, differs substantially from the one we consider in this paper and highlights a different kind of strategic effect. To our knowledge, however, in the existing oligopoly literature on outsourcing issues related to incomplete contracts and relationship specific investment are not taken into account and their role in determining the nature of the trade-offs facing firms when making their mode of operation decisions are therefore disregarded.
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We develop an oligopoly model in which downstream firms that outsource 7 enter a bilateral relationship with an upstream firm that must carry out a relationship specific investment.
Rather than focusing on an incentive contract that tries to encourage investment -as in Grossman and Hart (1986) -we assume that if the final good firm chooses to outsource, then it and its intermediate input supplier bargain ex-post (after investment has been sunk) over the price of the intermediate. The fact that an enforceable contract cannot be written in advance of the relationship specific investment then gives rise to a hold-up problem that in this model leads to an underinvestment in quality which may in turn result in a higher marginal production cost. The literature on the organisation of production focuses on the effect of organisational costs on the choice of mode of operation. 8 In our model the main advantage of vertical integration for the final producer is that it avoids the hold-up problem and its main disadvantage is the existence of a fixed corporate governance cost associated with managing a larger and more complex organisation.
Some contributions on the Japanese Keiretsu are more in line with the standard outsourcing literature. For instance, in Spencer and Qui (2001) downstream Cournot oligopolists buy from upstream keiretsu members in a context in which investment contracts cannot be written and upstream firms carry out relationship specific investments. Their paper, however, does not endogenise the outsourcing decision.
7
Following standard terminology, by outsourcing we mean the acquisition of an input or service from another firm. Bhagwati et al (2005) use the term in a much more restricted way to mean the acquisition of services from unaffiliated foreign firms.
8
The separation of organisational costs into managerial and transactions costs goes back to Coase (1937) .
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The basic model is introduced in Section 2 and the four-stage game between the home and foreign firm and the supplier of the intermediate is solved in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the effects of trade liberalisation on the outcome of the game and on the welfare of consumers.
Section 5 draws some conclusions and suggests some directions for future research.
THE MODEL
There are two final good firms, one located in the home country and one located in a foreign country. The firms produce a homogenous product and compete in the home market only.
Demand in the home market is given by:
where p is the price of the good, a is a constant parameter, and y and * y are the quantities produced by the home and foreign firm respectively (henceforth, an asterisk will denote the foreign variables and parameters).
We assume that the production of the final good requires a specialised component, which is combined in fixed proportions with other inputs (such as labour investment in its quality and customisation to the final good production. We will assume that
, where K is investment in quality and customisation. Using the subscripts V and O to denote vertical integration and outsourcing respectively, marginal production cost for the domestic firm will thus be:
if the firm outsources its intermediate, and
if it produces it in-house.
If the home firm is vertically integrated, its profit function is given by:
where
is the investment cost incurred with respect to the intermediate and G represents the fixed governance cost that a vertically integrated firm is assumed to incur. In line with the literature on vertical integration, we assume that governance costs are higher for a vertically integrated firm than for a firm that outsources; without loss of generality, we shall then set the governance cost for the latter to zero. If the firm chooses to outsource, its profit function will therefore be:
Similarly, the profit functions for the foreign firm in the two regimes are respectively given by:
and
where foreign marginal costs 
Similarly, the profit of the intermediate firm in the foreign country will be given by:
We now turn to the discussion of the game.
THE GAME
The model is a four stage game. In stage one, firms decide whether to outsource their intermediate or to produce it in-house. If they decide to outsource, they approach a specialised supplier firm, located in their respective domestic market, which will produce the intermediate.
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In stage two, the firms invest in the development of the intermediate. If the downstream firms opt for outsourcing, then it is the specialised supplier firms that undertake this investment. In stage three, the firms (if they out-source) bargain with the intermediate supplier over the price of the intermediate. We assume that the final good producer only has enough time to negotiate with a single supplier. As in Grossman and Helpman (2003) , should bargaining breakdown, the producer will not have sufficient time to produce the intermediate itself, and so will exit the market -while the supplier will have wasted its investment. In stage four, the intermediate is supplied and the final output is produced.
12
In the final stage of the game the two firms engage in Cournot competition with outputs determined by the first-order conditions, respectively given by: 10 We assume that the marginal production cost of the intermediate can differ depending on whether it is produced in-house or by the upstream firm, thus m r is not necessarily equal to r. 11 One could think of there being ex-ante many identical potential intermediate suppliers. However, given that there is only one downstream firm, only one firm will enter in equilibrium since with more than one upstream firm, as a result of Bertrand competition between firms, the intermediate price would be driven to the marginal production cost and the firms will be unable to cover their investment and fixed entry costs -with more firms, the effective bargaining power of each intermediate producer would drop to zero (i.e., the downstream producer would induce mutual undercutting by the upstream firms to drive the price of the intermediate to marginal cost.
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and:
where c and * c will vary depending on the mode of operation chosen by the firms. The resulting equilibrium output for the home and foreign firm respectively will then be:
There are four regimes: and (O,O) , where the first letter refers to the home country and the second refers to the foreign country. Given the number of possible outcomes, and the corresponding binary choices of the firms, a detailed discussion of each individual regime would be very tedious and yield few additional insights. Instead, we shall look in detail at a situation in which, given the vertical integration of one of the firms, the other firm chooses its mode of operation. Once the nature of the strategic effects that are at play is understood, we shall then briefly discuss the other cases. Therefore, let us first consider the case in which the home firm vertically integrates and focus on the choice facing the foreign firm between vertical integration and outsourcing. We will then briefly discuss the outsourcing decision of the foreign firm when the home firm outsources as well as the outsourcing decisions of the home firm.
The home firm is vertically integrated
When the home firm is vertically integrated, we need to distinguish between the subgame in which the foreign firm also vertically integrates and the one in which it outsources. We shall discuss these two cases in the two next subsections respectively. Stage three of the game will only exist if the foreign firm chooses to outsource production of its intermediate input. In stage two, firms choose their level of investment in the intermediate good.
The foreign firm vertically integrates when the home firm is vertically integrated
We first consider the subgame in which the foreign firm produces the intermediate in-house. In choosing its optimal investment level, in stage two of the game each firm takes account of both 8 the direct cost-reducing effect of investment on its own profit and also the strategic effect on its rival's output in the final stage. Thus, the home firm's first-order condition is:
where the first term on the right-hand side, 
Similarly, the foreign firm's first-order condition for investment when it produces the intermediate in-house is:
which implies:
The foreign firm outsources when the home firm is vertically integrated
We now consider the subgame in which the foreign firm outsources its intermediate. Next, we will consider how the first-order conditions for investment are modified by the decision of the foreign firm to outsource. When the foreign firm chooses outsourcing, investment in k * is undertaken by the intermediate firm.
We begin with the investment decision of the home firm. An increase in k will not now have as large a negative effect on the foreign firm's output as when the latter is vertically integrated. The reason for this is that an increase in k results in a lower q * , thus helping to partially offset the negative impact on * y . Thus, even though the home firm's first-order condition takes the same form as in (11), the derivative dk dy / * is different, as k now also affects * y through changes in * q . Hence, the strategic incentive for home investment is lessened as a result of the endogenous change in the price of the intermediate because
Rearranging, we get:
, the absolute value of which is less than that in the vertical integration case (-1/3) except when 1 * = β , that is when the foreign firm has maximum bargaining power in its negotiations with the supplier firm. Thus, the first-order condition can be rewritten as:
The distribution of rents between intermediate supplier and final good producer (and hence the return for relationship-specific investment) is determined through Nash bargaining over the price after investment is sunk.
A comparison of the investment-to-output ratios in (12) and (17) reveals that the home firm's equilibrium investment-to-output ratio is lower when its rival outsources its intermediate than when it produces it in-house (except when 1 * = β ). Effectively, outsourcing by the foreign firm 'softens' the behaviour of its rival, inducing it to invest less per unit of output. As will become clearer later, this behaviour gives rise to a strategic motive for outsourcing.
In the foreign country, the supplier firm now undertakes the investment in the intermediate good. This firm chooses k * to maximise (6). The intermediate firm only receives a share (determined by its bargaining power) of the rent generated by the investment; as a result, the firm does not fully appropriate the marginal benefit of its investment and this reduces the incentive to invest. In addition, note that the upstream foreign firm does not directly strategically interact with the home firm (this is evident from the profit function ) , ( * * * k y μ which does not depend directly on y) -unlike the vertically integrated foreign firm which, as we saw earlier, does invest strategically. This also works to reduce the marginal benefit of investment.
We can use (16) in (6) to obtain:
The first order condition for the profit maximising choice of k * is then:
It is straightforward to show that 0
and so the first-order condition can be written as:
Note that as β * rises, the producer invests less per unit of output as its share of the rents that are generated falls. In the limit, when the upstream firm has no bargaining power (i.e. * β =1), it will have no incentive to make any relationship-specific investment. This implies that the foreign equilibrium investment-to-output ratio is lower when a firm outsources its intermediate than when it produces it in-house. 
The choice of the foreign firm's mode of operation
To establish whether the foreign firm will outsource or choose to be vertically integrated we must compare its profits under the two regimes. However, since the ultimate aim of our analysis is to determine how the choice of the mode of operation can be used strategically by firms to affect the oligopoly game between them, it proves useful to first examine how the make-or-buy decision affects investment levels, equilibrium market shares and output levels. A natural approach to this question is to consider the effect of the mode of operation on the firms' output reaction functions.
Nevertheless, these do not take account of the indirect effect of the foreign firm's outsourcing on output through changes in the level of investment and the price of the intermediate good. For instance, the foreign reaction function that is obtained from the output first-order condition in (8) can be written as ) ; ( would not overcome the fact that the share going to the investing firm is lower than unity due to its limited bargaining power. Hence, the main intuition of our model would qualitatively go through, but we feel it is more interesting and realistic to stick to our assumption. (21) and (22) (21) and (22) Φ ≠ , the effect of outsourcing on firms' market shares will depend on the extent of the relative cost disadvantage between the two firms. For instance, at ρ * =0 and when the underlying competitive difference between firms is low, that is when Φ is small (as in Figure 1 ), outsourcing by the foreign firm lowers its market share and raises the market share of the home firm. This does not imply that outsourcing necessarily reduces foreign profits. It must be remembered that outsourcing also saves on governance costs and raises the market price. When Φ is large enough, i.e. when the foreign firm is sufficiently uncompetitive, the market share shifting effect of outsourcing is reversed. We show this in Figure 2 in which ρ * =0 and Φ is large. Compared to Figure 1 , the foreign output response functions have moved inward.
Inspection of (21) and (22) 
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In Figure 2 , outsourcing by the foreign firm increases its own market share at the expenses of the home firm. With ρ * =0, the change in regime between outsourcing and vertical integration causes the output response curves to pivot around the firms' zero output points. Thus, the effect of outsourcing on an output response curve is greater the further we are away from the firm's zero output point. When Φ is high, the foreign firm's relative market share is small and the negative impact of outsourcing on the foreign output response curve is locally very small, while the negative effect on the corresponding home curve is locally much larger. The net result is that home output falls and foreign output rises. Note that the seemingly paradoxical result that * * VV VO y y > , when Φ is very large despite an inward shift of the output response curve, is due to strategic interaction between firms under oligopoly and would not occur under monopoly. The firm's decision to outsource can raise its own market share when the effect on the strategic aggressiveness of its rival is very strong. This is more likely to be the case the larger the rival's market share in the initial equilibrium, because the bigger and more powerful is one's competitor, the larger the gain from reducing its aggressiveness.
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Because of this strategic effect, outsourcing can sometime be optimal even when it is unambiguously cost increasing.
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Figure 2 about here
The above analysis can be summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: (i)
Outsourcing by the foreign firm can never result in an increase in the output of both firms; (ii) At Φ=ρ * =0, the foreign firm's output always falls if it outsources; (iii) at Φ=0, there always exists a ρ * large enough that, following outsourcing, the foreign firm's output rises at the expense of the home firm's one; (iv) at ρ * =0, there exists a Φ large enough such that outsourcing increases the foreign firm's output at the expense of the home firm's.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Equipped with this analysis, we can now proceed to compare the profits of the foreign firm under outsourcing and under vertical integration (given home vertical integration). To this end, it is useful to obtain an expression for profits in terms of outputs and parameters only. 18 In this analysis we have, for simplicity, focused on the case of Φ>0. If Φ<0, the home firm is small and the returns to the foreign firm from reducing its aggressiveness by outsourcing is consequently reduced. Hence, at * 0 ρ = and Φ<0, outsourcing could never increase the foreign firm's output. Therefore, Φ<0 is qualitatively a special case of Φ small. 19 In the case shown in Figure 2 , even when * * 0 G ρ = = , outsourcing increases the profit of the foreign firm.
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The output first order condition in (8) and the profit function under outsourcing in (4b) yield:
The corresponding expression under vertical integration is obtained by using the first-order conditions for output and for investment, given by (8) and (14) respectively, in (4a) to get
It is immediately obvious from equations (23) and (24) 21 This is because, when the foreign firm outsources, the negative effect of a higher Φ is partially offset by a fall in q * .
A comparison of the profits of the foreign firm under the two regimes enables us to determine whether a threshold level of Φ exists that will induce a switch in the firm's preferred mode of operation. there is a trade-off between outsourcing and vertical integration. This region is not very interesting, however, because outsourcing is then trivially dominant. 22 The figure is drawn for 2 / 1 * = β . However, it can be shown that even large changes in * β make no qualitative difference. 16 level of governance costs above which the foreign firm will chose to outsource. In the region above (below) the curve, for any given level of Φ, governance costs are high (low) and the foreign firms chooses outsourcing (vertical integration).
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Figure 3 about here
As is clear from the figure, the critical value of G * falls in Φ indicating that from the final goods producer's perspective an increase in competitive pressure works in favour of outsourcing.
The explanation for the negative slope of this locus is that the profits under outsourcing fall less quickly in Φ than the profit under vertical integration. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, an increase in Φ strengthens the foreign firm's strategic incentive to outsource in order to reduce the aggressiveness of the home firm. Secondly, an increase in Φ also reduces the strategic incentives to vertically integrate. To sees this, consider that when the firm chooses vertical integration, it trades off a higher fixed cost for higher operating profits. 24 The relative gain from vertical integration depends on this improvement in operating profits achieved in exchange for the higher fixed governance costs. However, the difference in operating profits between the two modes of operation narrows in Φ, as under outsourcing the fall in * q works to cushion the fall in operating profits -while no such effect occurs under vertical integration.
At approximately Φ/A=0.22, the indifference locus falls below zero: hence, outsourcing is always preferred when, due to high competitive pressure, the firm's market share is small. This is not surprising given that, as we saw above, a sufficient condition for
(it has been stated in Proposition 1.(iv) and shown in Figure 2 that a large enough value of Φ exists such that the latter inequality holds). When the locus falls below the axis, the firm will choose to outsource even when G * =0 (and ρ * =0). In this region, * * * m q r r > = . Thus, outsourcing is optimal in this region even though it is unambiguously cost increasing. This region corresponds to the case shown in Figure 2 , in which the pure strategic motive for outsourcing dominates. The result that outsourcing is more likely when the firm faces a high competitive pressure is consistent with empirical evidence that points to the fact that the use of subcontractors is more common amongst smaller and less profitable firms -e.g. Kimura (2002) . 
From (25), we can see that * μ is increasing in * y and thus is falling in Φ -i.e., an increase in competitive pressure may prevent the provision of an outsourcing service since, given F * >0, there is a threshold level of Φ above which outsourcing is impossible as the supplier will not find it profitable to enter. Thus, at a high level of Φ the foreign firm would be forced back to vertical integration -and this level of Φ is lower the higher is F * .
These results suggest that it is in the intermediate range level of competitive pressure that outsourcing is most likely.
Both Firms Choose the Mode of Operation
Having examined in detail the foreign firm's choice of mode of operation, when the home firm is vertically integrated, we will now briefly consider the remaining cases.
The home firm's choice between outsourcing and vertical integration when its rival is vertically integrated is essentially the same as that of the foreign firm discussed above. With the foreign firm vertically integrated, the home firm's indifference locus is the curve
However, note that an increase in Φ improves the competitive position of the home firm and thus works to improve its relative return to vertical integration. Hence, this curve slopes upwards in (Φ, G) space (see Figure 4 ). As discussed above for the case of the foreign firm, the choice of vertical integration involves trading off high fixed costs for low marginal costs. As the home firm's relative cost competitiveness rises, the relative disadvantage of incurring the governance cost falls and hence the relative return from expanding production via the vertical integration option rises. Indeed, the choice of vertical integration is strategically more aggressive, because it involves lower marginal costs and hence higher output in exchange for higher governance costs.
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A fall in Φ, by increasing the competitive pressure on the home firm, would increases the relative attractiveness of outsourcing even though by outsourcing the firm further reduces its output. this region, the optimal strategy for the home firm is to vertically integrate, given that the foreign firm outsources, and the best reply for the latter is to outsource, given that the home firm vertically integrates. In the area bordered by the loci
is also an equilibrium -together with (V,O). In this region, outsourcing is the best response for the home firm to foreign vertical integration, and vertical integration is the best response for the foreign firm to home outsourcing -at the same time, home vertical integration is the best response to foreign outsourcing and foreign outsourcing is the best response to home vertical integration.
Hence, this is a region of multiple equilibria. These equilibrium regimes are represented in Figure 5 . Differences in Φ can be driven by two things: differences in transport costs or differences in underlying marginal costs (which may in turn be due to international differences in factor prices, in particular labour costs). If there are underlying differences in factor cots, then these may also give rise to differences in the level of the fixed governance cost. Hence, if foreign factor prices are higher, we may then expect G * >G. Let G * =γG with γ>1. Then, it is easy to show that in the (Φ, G) space, an increase in γ shifts the foreign loci downward proportionallyhence resulting in less foreign and more home vertical integration.
TRADE LIBERALISATION
In this section we briefly bring out the implications of our analysis for the effects of trade liberalisation, modelled as a fall in the level of trade costs t, on firms' optimal mode of operation.
We shall also briefly explore its implications for the consumer.
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As we saw in the previous section, a fall in trade costs will change the level of Φ. This will have implications for output, prices and investment under a give regime, but under some circumstances it will also lead to a regime shift. We shall begin by examining the effects of trade liberalisation within a given regime and then consider its effects on regime outcomes.
Under a given regime, a fall in t improves the relative competitive position of the foreign firm at the expense of the home firm and this will result in a market share reallocation in favour of the former. Under outsourcing, this market share reallocation results in an increase in the negotiated price of the intermediate in the foreign country, provided that the supplier firm has some bargaining power. Trade liberalisation will have the opposite effect in the home country, where it will lead to a fall in the negotiated price of the intermediate good. This is because trade liberalisation increases (decreases) the available rents in the foreign (home) country. As a result of trade liberalisation, the decline in the output of the home firm is proportionally smaller, due to the asymmetric effects of trade costs on the firms. Hence, the final good's price must fall, as t falls. These results are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: For a given regime, trade liberalisation leads to (i) under both outsourcing or inhouse production, an increase (fall) in foreign (home) output and investment, and a fall in the market price; (ii) under outsourcing, an increase (decrease) in the price of the intermediate good in the foreign (home) country.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Trade liberalisation can also lead to regime shifts as it can affect firms' decision about their mode of operation. As we saw in the previous section, a fall in t (i.e. in Φ) will increase the incentive of the foreign firm and decrease the incentive of the home firm to choose vertical integration.
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In Figure 6 , which is similar to Figure 5 but has trade costs on the horizontal axis and G=G * on the vertical axis, at free-trade the foreign firm has an underlying cost advantage. In notational terms, Φ<0 at t=0. by one of the firms to vertical integration (outsourcing), there will a discrete increase (fall) in that firm's output and in industry output, and a fall (increase) in the output of the rival firm.
Proof: see Appendix C.
As discussed previously, asymmetric equilibria are more likely the more asymmetric the underlying marginal cost structures of the firms (i.e. the larger is Φ in absolute value). Thus, in the Figure 6 , we see that (V,O) is the typical outcome when t is high and hence the foreign firm has a strong competitive disadvantage, but for low trade costs, (O,V) can emerge as the competitive advantage swings towards the foreign firm. Also note that the range of G over which multiple equilibria occurs is at its largest when Φ is zero.
Finally, we can now briefly explore the implications of the analysis for the effects of trade liberalisation on the consumer in the home country. Trade liberalisation at a given regime raises output (see Proposition 2) and thus works to increase consumer surplus. This increase in consumer surplus is further enhanced when a threshold is crossed that leads the foreign firm to switch to vertical integration. This is because when the foreign firm switches to vertical integration, both its own and the industry outputs experience a discrete upward jump. Trade liberalisation however leads to a discrete downward jump in consumer surplus when it results in the crossing of a threshold that brings about a switch to outsourcing by the home firm. This implies that, somewhat counter-intuitively, consumer surplus is not always maximised at freetrade.
at low values of t (Φ<0) the foreign firm has a cost advantage. Other constellations of parameters values can be considered but this one is chosen because it captures all the interesting cases.
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SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have developed a model of endogenous outsourcing in an international oligopoly setting. In line with some other recent theoretical contributions, we have modelled the outsourcing arrangement as one where a final good producer enters a bilateral relationship with an upstream supplier which undertakes a relationship-specific investment. Earlier work that has adopted this approach has done so within a non-strategic monopolistically competitive market structure. We have demonstrated that the oligopolistic setup implies that additional strategic considerations may play a role in explaining the choice of mode of operation of firms. In particular, we have shown that both strategic vertical integration and strategic outsourcing are possibilities in our model.
A vertically integrated firm incurs additional governance costs that can be avoided by sourcing components outside the firm. If the outside supplier is not significantly more efficient at providing the intermediate to the required specifications, however, outsourcing will raise the final goods producer's marginal production costs since the supplier fails to fully internalise the marginal benefit of investment. Outsourcing then involves accepting higher marginal costs in exchange for a saving on fixed (governance) costs. In a Cournot oligopoly setting, this gives rise to an additional strategic incentive to vertically integrate -as the lower marginal costs reduce the rival's output and thus indirectly raises the integrated firm's profits. 27 However, strategic outsourcing is also a possibility even when it results in higher marginal costs. This is because when a firm chooses outsourcing, the rival firm's incentive to invest strategically is reduced. We have shown that when a firm has a sufficiently small market share under vertical integration, it has an incentive to strategically switch to outsourcing so as to increase its own and reduce its rival's investment and output.
Unlike most contributions in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002) , this model gives rise to the possibility of 'mixed outcomes' in which, even when firms are ex-ante symmetric, they may choose different modes of operation in equilibrium; this is consistent with existing stylised facts whereby not all firms in the same industry and in all countries adopt the same mode of operation strategy.
In our model, the choice of the mode of operation by firms is shown to depend on the combined effect of strategic considerations and the competitive pressure facing firms. In general,
we find that an increase in competitive pressure leads to a greater 'demand' for outsourcing.
When a firm faces an exogenous increase in its marginal production costs or a fall in that of its rival, its share in total investment is lower and it has more to gain from inducing its rival to be less strategically aggressive in its choice of investment. Thus, competitive pressure strengthens the strategic incentive for outsourcing. In addition to this effect, firms under intense competitive pressure are relatively less able to gain from taking on the fixed vertical integration costs in exchange for lower marginal production costs as these lower costs apply to a relatively smaller market share. Thus, competitive pressure weakens the strategic incentive to vertically integrate.
Taken together, these two effects imply that an increase in competitive pressure will work in favour of outsourcing. Although the 'demand' for outsourcing tends to increase in the extent of competitive pressure, the 'supply' of outsourcing will decrease; this is because the profitability of the intermediate goods producer decreases when the upstream firm requires fewer inputs and rents fall. Thus our model suggests that we can expect outsourcing to be more likely when firms face intermediate levels of competitive pressure.
Trade liberalisation directly impacts on the competitive pressure facing the firmsintensifying it for the home final goods firm and relaxing it for its foreign rival. Thus, a fall in trade costs makes outsourcing more likely in the home country and it reduces the relative returns to outsourcing for the foreign firm. This is because firms with a lower marginal cost are better able to reap the benefits of freer trade.
We also considered the implications of trade liberalisation and endogenous outsourcing for consumers. Since the higher marginal costs that outsourcing implies leads to higher final goods prices, the benefits of trade liberalisation for consumers are enhanced when it leads to less outsourcing.
The model developed in this paper allows for the endogenous emergence of different mode of operation equilibria and yields results that are not always obvious but contribute to explain stylised facts. Whilst fairly simple, the basic framework developed in this paper is flexible enough to allow to be easily extended to consider different outsourcing scenarios (such as sourcing from abroad rather than domestically) and alternative assumptions concerning the trading setup. Preliminary results on these extensions allow us to strongly conjecture that the main effects of competitive pressure on the outsourcing decision of firms are robust.
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Appendix A -Proof of Proposition 1
We will find it useful to rewrite the output response functions in compact form: Thus the firms' outputs cannot both increase when the foreign firm outsources. 
Proof of Proposition 1(ii)
.
Appendix B -Proof of Proposition 2
We will use the same notation as in Appendix A.
Totally differentiating the equations in (A1) we get: 
Appendix C -Proof of Proposition 3
As a first step to proving this proposition, we first need to show that the foreign indifference loci fall in t and the corresponding home loci are increasing in t. Define the threshold level of governance costs at which the home (foreign) firm is indifferent between vertical integration and outsourcing given that the other firm chooses As we are concerned with situations in which G>0, the relevant section to consider for these loci is where they are positive. with (A5), we get (A4), which implies that the loci are downward sloping.
Proof of Proposition 3(i).
The proof follows directly from the slope of the loci. When its rival chooses mode of operation j, then above j G ( * j G ) the home (foreign) firm chooses to outsource and below the locus it chooses to vertically integrate.
* j G is monotonically decreasing in t. Thus, at a given G, a fall in t that results in a crossing of this threshold will move us to a point below * j G ; hence, if the home firm is choosing mode of operation j, a fall in t will result in a switch to vertical integration by the foreign firm. Similarly, given that j G is monotonically increasing in t, at a given G, a fall in t that results in a crossing of this threshold will move us to a point above j G and, if the foreign firm is choosing mode of operation j, result in a switch to outsourcing by the home firm. Hence, a fall in t cannot lead to a switch towards (away from) vertical integration for the home (foreign) firm. 
Proof of Proposition 3(ii)
